

Book outline

Terrorism and Extremism Book Series with I.B. Tauris

Terrorism in the Cold War: State Involvement and Covert Operations
Eds. Adrian Hänni, Thomas Riegler, Przemyslaw Gasztold

1. Project Details

Accounts of the relationships between states and terrorist organizations in the Cold War era have long been shaped by speculation, a lack of primary sources and even conspiracy theories. In the last few years, however, things have evolved rapidly. Several original research projects for a wide range of states and areas, based on recently released archival documents, shed new light on the relations between state and terrorist actors, allowing for a fresh and much more insightful assessment of the contacts, dealings, agreements and collusion with terrorist organizations undertaken by state actors on both sides of the Iron Curtain.

The proposed book collects the various new insights in a volume that presents the current state of research, including a comprehensive assessment, of the nature, motives, effects and historical shifts of the relations between individual states and terrorist organizations. While most articles deal with the 1970s/1980s, a time period in which almost every important terrorist group had at least one state sponsor, the geographico-political focus is on Warsaw Pact and NATO countries as well as the role of European neutrals such as Austria and Switzerland. The articles collected demonstrate that these state-terrorism relationships were not only much more ambiguous, complex and multilayered than much of the older literature had suggested but are, in fact, crucial for the understanding of global political history in the Cold War era.

The individual contributions, which are written by leading experts on the respective countries, either provide original research and new insights or make research available in English for the first time. The latter is in itself of great value considering that much of the archive-based research of the last decade has been made available only in the respective national languages (East European, languages, German, Italian e.g.). Considering that “some of the most important foreign fighter movements in the world today receive massive and explicit state support” (Daniel Byman, “How States Exploit Jihadist Foreign Fighters”, *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, forthcoming), a historical assessment based on sound archival sources can further enhance scholarly understanding of more recent forms of terrorism. The proposed book therefore provides a needed and valuable contribution to the literature on terrorism, counterterrorism and terrorism history –

providing a basis and laying out potential paths forward for future research on state-terrorism relations.

While the proposed book will, in principal, compete with the large number of book dealing with terrorism, it is truly unique in its combination of theme, comparative approach, and historical perspective. It is also the first monograph to combine the scattered research on states-terrorism relations, made possible in recent years as a result of the opening of historical archives (especially in Central East Europe) and put the finding in a broader context. In regard to historical synthesis and theorizing, the essay collection expands on Daniel Byman's seminal work *Deadly Connections: States That Sponsor Terrorism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). The rich empirical base that informs the individual articles allows testing Byman's theoretical models and, in some cases, modifying them.

Considering the outlined character of the proposed book we are convinced that it would be a great fit for the Terrorism and Extremism Research Center's new interdisciplinary book series in association with I.B. Tauris.

The market for the book includes primarily political science, IR, and history departments as well as all academic departments, research institutes, scholarly societies, think tanks etc. with an interest in intelligence studies, terrorism studies and counter-terrorism. As a student text, the book will be particularly relevant for courses on the Cold War, terrorism, and terrorism history – mainly at graduate level but, due to its reader-friendly prose, also at Bachelor level. Secondary markets for the book are specialized journalists, non-academic readers interested in Cold War and/or intelligence history, as well as, to a somewhat lesser degree, security/intelligence officials and policy makers.

2. Contributors

- *Gordan Akrap*, St. George Association, Croatia
- *Jordan Baev*, Rakovski National Defense College, Bulgaria
- *Matthias Dahlke*, Humboldt University Berlin
- *Michael Fredholm*, IRI (independent research institute)/formerly Uppsala University
- *Przemyslaw Gasztold*, Historic Research Office of the Institute of National Remembrance in Warsaw
- *Isabella Ginor and Gideon Remez*, Hebrew University of Jerusalem
- *Marcel Gyr*, Neue Zürcher Zeitung (leading Swiss newspaper)
- *Adrian Hänni*, Distance Learning University Switzerland/University of Zurich
- *Tobias Hof*, University of Northern Carolina at Chapel Hill
- *Ryszard M. Machnikowski*, University of Lodz, Poland

- *Balázs Orbán-Schwarzkopf*, Historical Archives of Hungarian State Security
- *Daniel Rickenbacher*, ETH Zürich, Switzerland
- *Thomas Riegler*, independent researcher
- *Andrew Sanders*, Texas A&M University San Antonio
- *Bernd Schaefer*, George Washington University
- *Thomas Skelton-Robinson*, Hamburg Institute for Social Research
- *Philip W. Travis*, State College of Florida in Bradenton
- *Thomas Wegener Friis* (University of Southern Denmark), *Adi Frimark* (Bar-Ilan University, Israel) and *Martin Göllnitz* (University of Kiel, Germany)
- *Tobias Wunschik*, Stasi Records Agency (BStU), Berlin
- *Pavel Zacek*, CEVRO Institute, Prague / former Director of the Security Services Archive, Czech Republic

3. Table of content

Introduction

1. *Adrian Hänni, States and Terrorism in the Cold War: Myth and Reality*

Introductory article: overview over the collected essays, historical and historiographical contextualization, synthesis

Vol. 1 – Eastern Europe and the Soviet Sphere of Influence

2. *Isabella Ginor and Gideon Remez, The KGB's Abduction Program and the PFLP: On the Cusp between Intelligence and Terrorism*

Newly available evidence has confirmed that at the height of the Cold War, détente notwithstanding, Soviet intelligence not only practiced abduction for intelligence purposes, but also farmed it out to its sponsored terrorist organizations. The posthumously published memoirs of the Russian historian Dmitry Volkogonov include a “sensational” document whereby “in the late 1960s, the KGB [...] was tasked ‘to bring informed Americans to the USSR’.” This bolstered a singular case in which official Russian publications inadvertently disclosed (but authorities denied) the capture and transfer to the USSR in 1970 of a senior Israel Air Force pilot by the Soviet forces stationed on the Suez Canal. Newly accessible documentation has now revealed that a few months earlier, KGB chief Yuri Andropov proposed, and General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev approved, “an operation to abduct and transfer to the USSR the CIA deputy resident in Lebanon [...] by ‘Nationalist,’ a reliable agent of the [KGB] Beirut rezidentura.” “Nationalist” was the code name of Wadie Haddad, a co-

founder of the Popular Front for Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). This paper explores the details and wider context of this incident, which supports Volkogonov's claim and also exemplifies the problematic definition of terrorism and terrorist acts.

3. Michael Fredholm, Soviet Approaches to Muslim Extremism and Terrorism

During the Cold War, the intelligence services of the Soviet Union maintained contacts with terrorist groups motivated by leftism and nationalism. However, they had neither motive nor intention to support foreign jihadist terrorist organizations, with which they eventually had to struggle primarily in Syria and Afghanistan. Yet, because of an early assessment that the key threat from Islam derived from the Sufi brotherhoods, the Soviet security services already from the time of the Russian Revolution supported what they called revolutionary Islam, currently better known as Salafism or Wahhabism, as a tool to fight the Sufis. As for Soviet foreign intelligence, it focused on states, high politics, and foreign intelligence services, not Muslim affairs. As a result, it took considerable time for the Soviets to realize that underground networks of Sunni Islamic extremists, inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood and other Salafi groups in the Middle East, posed a terrorist threat to the Soviet state. This realization only emerged after the 1979 intervention in Afghanistan and during the simultaneous terror campaign carried out by the Muslim Brotherhood against the Soviet-supported Syrian government. This article describes the domestic security approaches to Muslim extremism employed by the Soviet state security services and describes Soviet foreign intelligence activities primarily in Afghanistan and to some extent Syria. Furthermore, the article details Soviet and Afghan intelligence activities and organizations in Afghanistan and Pakistan during the four Soviet interventions there from 1925 to 1989.

4. Tobias Wunschik, Palestinian Terrorism and the State Security of the GDR: Abu Nidal between East Berlin, Moscow and Washington 1973-1989

Palestinian terrorism constituted a threat not only for Israel but for the Western world as a whole. The eastern European states, on the other hand, provided the militants with a safe haven or even supported them. This can be shown exemplarily with a study of the dealing of the GDR's State Security with the group around Abu Nidal, who was one of the world's most dangerous terrorists in the 1980s. In the GDR he remained undisturbed from the manhunt organized by Western security services – much the same as “Carlos” and other terrorist actors – and was able to recruit new followers among the Palestinian students there. In 1984/1985, several dozen members of his group even received military training and ideological indoctrination in the GDR. In return, Abu Nidal had to promise to remain silent about the cooperation and to respect the “security interests of the GDR”. Such an approach also characterized the relations between the MfS and

other terrorist organizations such as West German groups. At the same time, the MfS intercepted phone calls and employed up to six informal collaborators against the Abu Nidal Organization. It always remained a balancing act to control Abu Nidal's associates without rebuffing them – and to hide all this from the global public. While protecting Abu Nidal due to ideological and power political considerations, the government of the GDR came increasingly under international suspicion that it was protecting Palestinian terrorism. Particularly the US government, owing to secret intelligence, was increasingly well-informed, leaked incriminating information to the media, and thus eventually forced the government of the GDR to the negotiating table.

5. Przemysław Gasztold, Polish Military Intelligence and Its Secret Relationship with the Abu Nidal Organization

The article describes various factors that paved the way to a close cooperation between the Polish military services and the Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) during the Cold War. Based on recently declassified documents from Polish and US archives, the author suggests that the driving force of mutual collaboration between Polish military services and terrorists belonging to the secret ANO network were financial profits, while ideology did not play any significant role in this shadowy relationship. The contacts between Polish military intelligence and ANO were established in the late 1970s. According to a secret agreement, several terrorists working for Abu Nidal were allowed to study at the Polish universities. In return companies owned by ANO's financial wing were used as brokers to sell Polish weapons abroad. Moreover, military intelligence used ANO members as a source of information regarding the situation in the Middle East, as well as a trusted provider of embargoed goods. Since the early 1980s the US intelligence agencies collected information about the Polish ties with ANO and in the mid-1980s. Ronald Reagan's administration started to exert pressure on Wojciech Jaruzelski's regime to break off contacts with terrorists. This resulted in several decisions by the authorities in Warsaw regarding its contacts to ANO. At first glance, the Polish government followed Washington's suggestions. However, unofficially military intelligence still wanted to cooperate with ANO in the field of arms trade and these murky relations lasted at least until 1990.

6. Pavel Žáček, Carlos the Jackal in Prague: Communist Czechoslovakia and International Terrorism – a Case Study

The terrorist Ilich Ramírez Sánchez, called Carlos, enjoyed sanctuary in the Soviet bloc countries in the 1970s and 1980s, allowing him to maintain an extensive network of extremists and carry out terrorist attacks. The gradual opening of files held by the former Federal Ministry of the Interior in the Czech Republic has permitted research into previously inaccessible topics such as the visits by Carlos and his associates to the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic

(CSSR). At the beginning, Carlos perceived its capital Prague as suitable for organizing meetings and negotiations. Czechoslovak State Security gradually combined various methods of intelligence gathering and thus kept Carlos and his group under close surveillance, which became much more effective through a closer collaboration with East German and Hungarian security services. While it never occurred to Czechoslovak State Security to arrest Carlos and his companions, they eventually managed to expel him for good in June 1986. The findings of this article indicate that the treatment of Carlos is, to a certain degree, exemplary of how Czechoslovakia handled terrorist actors with a presence in the country. Its approach was shaped not only by fears of retribution from the extremists, but also by political considerations regarding the Arab states supporting them.

7. Balázs Orbán-Schwarzkopf, Hungarian State Security and International Terrorism in the 1980s

The primary objective of this article is to give a brief summary, based on the available archival documents in the Historical Archives of State Security Services, of how and why the Hungarian counterterrorist organization developed from a small group into a big department in the span of a mere decade during the 1980s. Since a large part of the documents are still secret, this study can't be exhaustive but it nevertheless gives an overview over the Hungarian counterterrorism work in the 1980s. Thereby, this article constitutes the first academic investigation of the relations between Hungarian state actors and international terrorism. Hungary maintained friendly relationships with some terrorist organizations, giving direct support to Abu Abbas' Palestine Liberation Front while providing some other groups, such as the Grey Wolves, the Abu Nidal Organization and the Carlos group, with a sanctuary. On the other hand, Hungary itself increasingly became a target of Shia terrorist organizations that were used as proxies against the socialist republic by Middle Eastern state sponsors, especially Iran, in pursuit of strategic objectives.

8. Jordan Baev, Bulgarian State Security and International Terrorism

The article is based on the analysis of newly accessible security and intelligence records from the Bulgarian National Archives, among them the available operational dossiers on international terrorism. It is focused on three main issues: the first ever encounter of the Bulgarian communist state with international terrorist acts; the appearance of international terrorists on Bulgarian territory and their eventual contacts with the Bulgarian authorities; the documented story of the most disputable case during the last Cold War wave in the early 1980s, with the intensive propaganda campaign on the "key participation" of Bulgaria as a "state sponsoring terrorism and drug trafficking". Of particular interest as well are the unexpected initial contacts of the Bulgarian official representatives with

several NATO countries at the end of the 1980s for the establishment of informal institutional antiterrorist cooperation, which were transformed to joint operational actions after the political turn of Bulgaria in November 1989. The actual documentary story of Bulgarian State Security's attitude toward the "international terrorism" phenomenon in the Cold War era is far from the "one sided" strongly ideological interpretations of the past, confirming some but rebutting many other previous allegations.

9. Gordan Akrap, Yugoslavia, Carlos "the Jackal" and International Terrorism During the Cold War

The attitude of the Yugoslav political and state institutions to the problem of international terrorism during the Cold War depended on the decisions of President Josip Broz Tito, who was one of the founders of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Yugoslavia accordingly tried to take a distance from the then existing two political/military blocks, with a simultaneous desire of strengthening its influence among existing and possible future member states of the NAM. Following communist ideology, according to which the dictatorship of the proletariat and the widespread application of violence are permitted during the revolution, Yugoslavia has harbored a special affinity towards organizations and individuals that have conducted "struggle for national liberation" without making a difference between violent and non-violent methods for achieving their aims. In cases where identified international terrorists used the territory of Yugoslavia for their efforts aimed against other countries, Yugoslavia officially condemned international terrorism, taking the position that terrorist activities on its territory were not allowed, and that the Yugoslavian territory should not be used for arms and explosives smuggling. However, if the actors labeled as terrorists by the Western countries respected the necessity to keep a low profile in Yugoslavia, they were allowed to stay in the country. The case of multiple and long-term travels and residences of Carlos "the Jackal" in Yugoslavia is an excellent example of the Yugoslav policy of irresponsible behavior towards the problem of international terrorism and failure to comply with the proclaimed policy of a state that does not support terrorism.

10. Bernd Schaefer, North Korea's "Terrorism" and "Counterterrorism" in the Late 1980s

While there is quite some evidence for North Korean "state terrorism" against South Korea and its leaders, no evidence exists for potential coordination with other international "terrorist actors" or involvement in Ronald Reagan's so-called "confederation of terrorist states". North Korea was (and remains) a highly solipsistic actor, whose leaders were running on their own strategic clock of upheaval and vindictiveness. As a consequence, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) was at times itself paranoid with fears of terrorist acts

against the country. The World Youth Festival 1989 in Pyongyang, the largest ever influx of foreign visitors to North Korea, therefore led to unprecedented international DPRK "counter-terrorism" cooperation with Warsaw Pact countries, especially with the Ministry for State Security of the German Democratic Republic (GDR). It was destined to last well beyond the 1989 festival, but the collapse of communist East Germany in the fall of the same year rendered this cooperation moot. Still, the Stasi-North Korean intelligence cooperation was a remarkable episode during the final phase of the Cold War.

Vol. 2 – The West, the Middle East and Latin America

*11. Thomas Riegler, *Gladio – Myth and Reality: The Origins and Function of stay behind in the Case of Post-war Austria**

The NATO stay behind network, commonly known under its Italian codename Gladio, has become synonymous with state orchestrated terrorist violence. Originally designed as a guerrilla force in case of a Warsaw Pact invasion, stay behind is said to have been activated in order to prevent Communist parties from coming to power. Sporadic acts of right-wing terrorism were supposedly utilised to create tense situations, in which the electorate would rally behind the conservative status quo. The aim of this contribution is to critically examine many of the key assumptions on the stay behind networks – especially the claim of its hidden role in terrorist activities in Western Europe during the 1970s and 1980s. Recently released records on the origins and function of stay behind in post-war Austria allow a more fact-based approach to a phenomenon, which was essentially a tool for unconventional warfare against a supposed Red Army invasion. Summing it up, this contribution evaluates the discourse on stay behind, present new primary sources, and proposes a more nuanced assessment of this highly controversial topic.

*12. Andrew Sanders, *The British State and Loyalist Paramilitaries in Northern Ireland**

This article seeks to explore the relationship between British state actors and loyalist paramilitaries in Northern Ireland during the conflict that took place there between the late 1960s and the late 1990s. It will assess existing literature on the topic, one that is of continuing interest to scholars, and consider several state inquiries into controversial killings. It concludes that there remains little doubt that collusion took place between British agents and loyalist paramilitaries, the extent of this collusion and what levels of the British government were aware of its existence remain a matter of conjecture.

13. Marcel Gyr, The Secret 1970 Moratorium Agreement between Switzerland and the PLO

In late 1970 the Swiss authorities and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) struck a secret moratorium agreement. In my book *Schweizer Terrorjahre – Das geheime Abkommen mit der PLO*, published in January 2016, I named Pierre Graber, then head of the Swiss Federal Political Department, and Farouk Kaddoumi, co-founder of Fatah and later head of the PLO's political department, as the two dealmakers. The agreement was undertaken in order to prevent further attacks by Palestinian terrorist groups. In return the Swiss authorities offered diplomatic support in establishing a PLO office in proximity to the United Nations in Geneva. The deal followed a series of attacks that befell Switzerland, including the bombing of a Swissair airplane in February 1970 (with 47 deaths) and the multiple hijackings to Jordan in September 1970. Following my claims the Swiss authorities formed an inquiry commission to examine the case, which published its findings in May 2016 and reported that it had been unable to find explicit documentary evidence for such a deal and therefore concluded that no such agreement had been made. Despite the thoroughness of its investigation, and its weight, this official rebuttal of my findings was conspicuous for a number of deficiencies, prompting me to undertake renewed research. My further findings, coupled with my original statement, are presented in the following article, constituting a slight but important modification of the key figures involved, but equally a clarification and a re-assertion of the circumstances in which the claimed deal took place.

14. Thomas Skelton-Robinson, The Road Not Taken: Crisis Management, Dialogues and Deal-Making with Palestinian Fedayeen Groups during and after the Jordanian Hijacking Crisis of September 1970

The article supplements that by Marcel Gyr in the present volume, in which he adds further evidence for the existence of a secret agreement between Switzerland and the PLO in late autumn 1970. This contribution offers supplementary details and arguments for the plausibility of Gyr's thesis. It presents details from newly published accounts and archival information – mainly from Great Britain and the USA – showing maneuvers by other Western countries to accommodate the Palestinian guerrilla groups and a significant wider diplomatic opening, both public but also largely sub rosa, towards the Fatah that took place in the closing months of 1970. These developments have remained un-synthesized and little remarked upon to date. Apart from their intrinsic historical significance, they also represent the wider context within which the potential Swiss initiative has to be seen, as well as constituting a template against which similar arrangements by Western governments with the PLO throughout the 1970s can be set.

15. Tobias Hof, The Lodo Moro: Italy and the Palestine Liberation Organization

For the last few years the Italian public has been consumed by a controversial debate concerning the Lodo Moro – a secret agreement that existed between the Italian government and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in the 1970s and 1980s. This pact granted the Palestinians the right to move freely in and operate out of Italy as long as they did not participate in any attack on Italian soil. In return, Rome would lend the PLO its diplomatic support. Some scholars and politicians regard the Lodo Moro as the key to understand the major terrorist attacks in Italy since the late 1970s. They claim that it offers a unique explanation for the kidnapping and subsequent murder of Moro in 1978 and for the Bologna incident in 1980. In the following article, I will challenge this perception of the Lodo Moro by using the currently available facts and documents to contextualize this agreement within the larger sphere of domestic and international politics since the 1950s. I argue that the Lodo Moro is an example of realpolitik between the Palestinians and Italy, and that the terrorist attacks committed by the Palestinians in the 1970s and 1980s in Italy were the result of a long-standing power struggle between the moderate and radical factions of the PLO, not an indication of the agreement's demise.

16. Matthias Dahlke, Pact with the (Un)wanted? The Wischnewski Protocol as a Spotlight for Austro-German "Agreements" with Transnational Terrorists in the Late 1970s

The 'Wischnewski Protocol' provides testimony about a remarkable gathering in Vienna in autumn 1977. The participants were the Austrian chancellor Bruno Kreisky and a confidant of Hans-Jürgen Wischnewski for the German federal government as well as two Palestinian terrorists of the highest rank, among them Ali Hassan Salameh, who was allegedly one of the masterminds of the 1972 Olympic Games massacre in Munich. Shortly after the murder of Hanns Martin Schleyer and the skyjacking of the "Landshut" plane to Mogadishu, these unequal partners discussed an end to terrorism in Europe, which the Palestinians were supposed to achieve through their intimate knowledge of the terrorist networks. The PLO in return demanded political recognition, which was ultimately reached by a public meeting of Yasser Arafat with Willy Brandt and Bruno Kreisky in Vienna in 1979. The motivations of the participants diverged greatly, but were sufficiently congruent to come to 'agreements', at least in the case of Austria. Although most of the secret diplomacy will not have left traces in the archives, this valuable source is one rare example of how unconventionally Western European governments could pursue their anti-terrorism policy in the 1970s.

III – The Third World

17. *Ryszard M. Machnikowski, Hezbollah as an Iranian Proxy in the Age of the Cold War*

The emergence of the Hezbollah Shia movement in Lebanon in the early 1980s influenced not only Lebanese or regional but also global affairs. Favorable internal conditions created by the civil war in Lebanon in the 1970s had been skillfully utilized by a newborn Islamic revolutionary Iran to establish a new political and military force there. Since its very beginning during the last decade of the Cold War, this organization's resources have been employed by Iran and Syria to reduce the Western presence in the Middle East through the use of extreme political violence and to "resist" Israeli occupation of Southern Lebanon. Hezbollah belongs to a very small minority of "terrorist organizations" in that it not only managed to achieve most of its objectives but also to transform itself into an increasingly powerful political movement still active on the Lebanese political scene. Due to Iran's assistance its reach extends beyond this country and the region, and it can be traced on several continents. In the 1980s, the terrorist tactics used by Hezbollah operatives included simultaneous suicide bombings, kidnappings, the hijacking of airplanes and targeted murders, and were backed by guerilla warfare and artillery shelling. In this article, I discuss this early terrorist activity, which managed to derail U.S. and French policies towards Lebanon, Iran and Syria, and imposed heavy military pressure on Israel.

18. *Daniel Rickenbacher, The Propaganda Campaign for the PFLP in Switzerland 1969-1970*

This paper sheds light on state support for propaganda networks and the complicated interactions between Arab states, non-governmental and semi-governmental organizations in the years 1969-1970, when Switzerland became the target of a series of terrorist attacks and threats by the Palestinian Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). This terror wave was paralleled by a propaganda campaign, which sought to raise sympathy for the Palestinian cause and pressure Switzerland to release the terrorists. The main stage of the campaign was the trial against three PFLP terrorists in the Swiss city of Winterthur, which was turned into a tribunal against Switzerland's supposedly pro-Israeli foreign policy. The campaign was orchestrated by Arab League and Fatah networks in Switzerland, which had established themselves in Switzerland in the 1950s and 1960s. The campaign also enjoyed the support of Arab states, in particular Algeria and Libya, and the Arab press. The campaign was successful in intimidating Switzerland to prepare the release of the PFLP terrorists and influenced Switzerland's stance toward the Arab-Israeli conflict. It marked also a turning point in the Arab strategy in the Arab-Israeli conflict, which turned away from conventional military means towards asymmetric ones, notably propaganda, terrorism and diplomacy.

19. Philip W. Travis, The United States and Nicaragua: State Terrorism during the Late Cold War

This paper examines state terrorism in Latin America during the late Cold War, first, on a regional scale and, second, by using revolutionary Nicaragua as a case study of a state classified a sponsor of terrorism by the United States. The paper refutes the myth that the emergence of international terrorism as a modern foreign policy problem was either an exclusively Islamic or Middle Eastern problem or that it was a problem only associated with leftism or religious fanaticism. Instead, I demonstrate that Latin America factored centrally in the emergence of the modern state terror problem, but that it was a problem not confined to ideology and that even the United States was potentially complicit in the matter. During the 1980s Nicaragua was made a model by the Reagan administration for a redevelopment of US policy on state sponsorship of terrorism. However, the United States allegations were often exaggerations. This paper considers the accuracy of the Reagan administration's allegations against Nicaragua. The Nicaraguan government was primarily accused of support for the insurgents fighting the United States supported government in El Salvador. I argue that support for revolutionaries alone should not warrant an allegation of state terrorism and that to do so poses a threat to the principle of state sovereignty. The Nicaragua case also suggests that counterterrorism policies that rely on pre-emption and regime change pose a threat to the standards of international conduct.

Outlook

20. Thomas Wegener Friis, Adi Frimark and Martin Göllnitz, Writing the History of Modern International Terrorism: Where Are the Puzzles?

In the 1970s and 1980s, the groups of Palestinian origin were among the most modern terrorist actors as they were able to operate across the Middle East and Europe unhindered by national borders. Today, these groups would thus constitute a rewarding research object especially from the perspective of possible lessons learned. However, researchers are confronted with several obstacles. First, the source material is in a multitude of national languages and, shaped by the prism of national intelligence services, offers only a glimpse from a narrowly defined perspective. The authors encourage researchers to conduct more comparative analyses. Second, a number of intelligence agencies have by tradition been reluctant to grant access to historical files on terrorism. It is necessary that Western authorities follow the example of the former socialist states in Eastern Europe and open their files as well. As archives in the Arab countries are in many cases unlikely to be open to researchers, captured files are also an important resource. The recent wars fought by Western powers in Iraq and Libya offered unique opportunities to acquire intelligence files with insights

on terrorism of the late Cold War. Furthermore, Israel gained substantial amounts of PLO documents during the invasion of Lebanon in 1982.